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ABSTRACT 
We use a Computable General Equilibrium model to simulate the effects of an Environmental 
Tax Reform in a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain). The reform involves imposing a tax 
on CO2 or SO2 emissions and reducing either the Income Tax or the payroll tax of employers 
to Social Security, and eventually keeping public deficit unchanged. This approach enables us 
to test the so-called double dividend hypothesis, which states that this kind of reform is likely 
to  improve  both  environmental  and  non-environmental  welfare.  In  the  economy  under 
analysis, an employment double dividend arises when the payroll tax is reduced and, if CO2 
emissions  are  selected  as  environmental  target,  a  (limited)  strong  double  could  also  be 
obtained.  No  double  dividend  appears  when  Income  Tax  is  reduced  to  compensate  the 
environmental tax. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Some economists have argued that an environmental tax reform (ETR henceforth) consisting 
of  taxing  polluting  emissions  and  recycling  the  so-obtained  revenue  by  reducing  other 
distorting taxes, in such a way that public revenue remains unchanged, can give rise to the so-
called  double  dividend,  that  is,  an  environmental  improvement  (green  dividend)  and  a 
reduction of fiscal distortions (blue dividend) so that non-environmental welfare would also 
increase. 
The relevance of a double dividend has to do with the practical implementability of an ETR. 
Any  environmental  policy  is  likely  to  have  some  economic  costs  by  worsening  the 
performance of some economic variables, such as production, employment, inflation, and 
ultimately  (non-environmental)  welfare.  To  make  a  decision,  a  benefit-cost  analysis  is 
needed, in order to compare the environmental benefits and the economic costs from such a 
policy. The most difficult part of this analysis is how to measure environmental benefits, 
which do not usually have a market value. Nevertheless, if a double dividend exists, it is 
possible  to  improve  the  environmental  quality  without  any  cost  in  terms  of  non-
environmental  economic  welfare.  In  this  case,  it  can  be  argued  that the fiscal reform is 
desirable even without an  explicit  valuation of the environmental benefits. Note that the 
environmental policy could be justified by itself, even it has some economic cost; in this 
sense, the fact that a double dividend exists is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition, to 
justify an ETR. 
According  to  Mooij  (1999),  there  is  a  consensus  among  all  the  authors  concerning  the 
definition of the green dividend, but there exist different versions of the blue dividend. The 
so-called  weak  double  dividend  version  states  that  the  social  welfare  is  higher  when  an 
environmental tax is compensated by reducing a distorting tax rather than by a lump-sum ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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transfer. A strong double dividend exists if, apart from the environmental improvement, the 
non-environmental welfare is greater after performing the reform than before. Finally, an 
employment double dividend happens if the employment level increases after the reform, as 
compared with the situation before the reform. 
Basically all economists agree that there exists a green dividend, and most of them also agree 
that a double weak dividend is also likely to exist, but there is a controversial debate about the 
strong double dividend and the employment double dividend. The theoretical literature has 
not obtained clear-cut conclusions so far, but it suggests that the possibility to obtain a double 
dividend is low and it is subject to very stringent conditions about tax recycling. Pearce 
(1991), Repetto et.al. (1992), Nordhaus (1993) or Grubb (1993) among others argue that it is 
possible to improve tax efficiency by means of an ETR, while others, as Bovenberg and 
Mooij (1994) argue that this is not possible, in general, because environmental taxes are 
likely to increase, rather than reduce, previous distortions. 
Parry  (1995)  points  out  the  relevance  of  choosing  a  partial  equilibrium  or  a  general 
equilibrium approach to answer this question. Partial equilibrium models do not take into 
account the interactions between environmental taxes and previous distortions, and these 
effects tend to cause the double dividend to hold in partial equilibrium models but not in 
general equilibrium models. This is because the environmental tax eventually falls on labor 
income, so that labor taxes and emission taxes distort the labor market in a similar way. 
However labor taxes are more efficient from the levying point of view because environmental 
taxes also distort the relative prices between polluting and non-polluting goods, which erodes 
the tax base. So, from a non-environmental point of view, emission taxes are likely to cause a 
larger excess of burden. 
Notwithstanding, the economic literature also describes some mechanisms that may cause a 
strong  double  dividend,  or  an  employment  double  dividend  to  happen  in  a  general ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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equilibrium framework. An ETR could facilitate wage moderation and the reduction of labor 
market distortions in a situation in which imperfect competition has led to excessively high 
wages (Brunello, 1996; Carraro et.al., 1996). Bovenberg (1994) and Carraro and Soubeyran 
(1996) show that, if the initial tax system is suboptimal from a non-environmental point of 
view, an ETR can simultaneously reduce pollution and unemployment. We can conclude that 
opportunities to get a double dividend typically arise when there exist some market failures or 
some imperfections in the tax system (see also Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). For a survey 
on ETR and the double dividend, see Mooij (1999) or Goulder (1995). 
Given the difficulties to obtain clear-cut theoretical conclusions, it makes sense to perform an 
empirical analysis to test the economic effects of a specific reform in a selected country or 
region, by means of a suitable applied model. A number of authors, like Bovenberg and 
Goulder (1996), Bye (2000), Dessus and Bussolo (1998), Wender (2001), Xie and Saltzman 
(2000) o Yang (2001), have used Computable General Equilibrium (CGE henceforth) models 
to  assess  the  economic  effects  of  an  ETR.  These  models  perform  a  disaggregate 
representation of all the activity sectors and the equilibrium of all markets, according to basic 
microeconomic principles. 
In  Spain,  Manresa  and Sancho (2002), Gomez-Plana et.al. (2003)   and Labandeira  et.al. 
(2003) use CGE models to simulate the effect of environmental tax reforms nationwide. We 
are not aware of any application in the regional level. In this paper a CGE model is used to 
evaluate the environmental and economic effects of an ETR in a regional economy, in this 
case,  Andalusia  (Spain).  Specifically,  four  simulations  are  made,  by  combining  the 
introduction of a tax on CO2 or SO2 emissions with a reduction in Income Tax (IT hereafter) 
or in the payroll tax of the employers to Social Security (PT hereafter). We use an extension 
of the model by Cardenete and Sancho (2003), including polluting emissions and emission 
taxes. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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The  results show  that an employment  double  dividend is likely to arise when  the  PT is 
reduced to compensate the environmental tax. In the case of the CO2 tax, a strong double 
dividend is also obtained for low values of the environmental tax. No (employment or strong) 
double dividend exists when the environmental tax revenue is recycled by reducing the IT. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays the most important features of 
the CGE model
1 and the databases. Section 3 presents and justifies the simulations performed, 
and  specifically,  the  pollutants  to  be  taxed  and  the  selected  tax  combinations.  Section  4 
summarizes the results and offers some economic interpretations. Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. THE MODEL AND THE DATABASES 
 
2.1. The model 
The model comprises 24 productive sectors, after aggregation of the 1990 Input-Output tables 
of  Andalusia.  The  production  technology  is  given  by  a  nested  production  function.  The 
domestic output of sector j, measured in euros and denoted by Xdj, is obtained by combining, 
through a Leontief technology, outputs (including energy) from the rest of sectors and the 
value added VAj. In turn, this value added is from primary inputs (labor, L, and capital, K), 
combined by a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall output of sector j, Qj, is obtained from a 
Cobb-Douglas  combination  of  domestic  output  and  imports  Xrowj,  according  to  the 
Armington  hypothesis  (1969),  in  which  domestic  and  imported  products  are  taken  as 
imperfect substitutes. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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The government raises taxes to obtain public revenue
2, as well as it gives transfers to the 
private  sector,  TPS,  and  demands  goods  and  services,  GDj.  PD  gives  the  final  balance 
(surplus or deficit) of the public budget
3: 
j j p GD cpi TPS R PD - - =           (1) 
cpi being the Consumer Price Index and pj a production price index before Value Added Tax 
(VAT hereafter) referring to all goods produced by sector j. Tax revenue includes that raised 
from the environmental tax. 
Let Ej denote polluting emissions from sector j, measured in CO2 or SO2 tons. Then, we have 
the  following  equation,  which  assumes  a  linear  relationship  between  production  and 
emissions: 
Ej  j Qj            (2) 
where  j measures the amount of pollution for every euro of output produced in sector j. The 
technical parameter  j accounts for the differences in pollution intensities across sectors. 
Typically, very energy-intensive sectors (and, especially fossil-fuels-intensive) are also very 
polluting (and hence display a high value of  j)
4. 
The government imposes a tax of t euros per ton of emissions. As a consequence, each sector 
j pays 
Tj = t Ej            (3) 
 Note that the different pollution intensity across sectors causes that the same tax on pollution 
implies a different economic burden with respect to output. Substituting (2) into (3), the 
amount to be paid by sector j can be written as 
Tj  j Qj            (4) ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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where  j W j is the marginal and average tax rate of sector j in terms of euro paid per euro 
produced (see equation A.8 in the appendix for the exact specification of the environmental 
tax in the CGE model). 
There is only one foreign sector, which comprises the rest of Spain, Europe and the rest of the 









j EXP   rowp TROW IMP   rowp ROWD       (5) 
where IMPj denotes imports of sector j, EXPj exports of sector j and TROW transfers from 
abroad for the consumer. ROWD is the balance of the external sector. 
Final demand comes from investment, exports and consumption demand from households. In 
our  model,  there  exist  24  different  goods  –corresponding  to  productive  sectors-  and  a 
representative consumer who demands present consumption goods and saves the remainder 
of  her  disposable  income.  Consumer  income  (YD  henceforth)  equals  labor  and  capital 
income, plus transfers, minus direct taxes: 
YD=  w L + r K + cpi TPS +TROW -  DT (r K + cpi TPS +TROW) 
- DT (w L - WC w L) - WC w L                (6) 
where w and r denote input (labor and capital) prices and L and K input quantities sold by the 
consumer,  DT  is  the  IT  rate  and  WC  the  tax  rate  corresponding  to  the  payment  of  the 
employees to Social Security (ESS hereafter). The consumer’s objective is to maximize her 
welfare, subject to her budget constraint. Welfare is obtained from consumption goods CDj (j 
= 1,…, 24) and savings SD, -according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
YD   SD   p CD p                         s.t.
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pinv being an investment price index. 
Regarding investment and saving, this is a saving driven model. The closure rule is defined in 
such  a  way  that  investment  is  exogenous,  savings  are  determined  from  the  consumer’s 







inv j ROWD PD SDpinv p INV         (8) 
Labor and capital demands are computed under the assumption that firms minimize the cost 
of producing value added. In the capital market we consider that supply is perfectly inelastic. 
In the labor market, there is a feedback between the real wage rate and the unemployment 
rate. This feedback somehow represents rigidities in the labor market that are related to the 
power of unions or other friction inducing factors (see Kehoe et al. (1995)). Specifically, we 















=           (9) 
where  u  and  u   are  the  unemployment  rates  in  the  simulation  and  in  the  benchmark 
equilibrium  respectively,  and  q   is  an  elasticity  constant  that  represents  the  degree  of 
flexibility  of  the  real  wage  (as  is  usual  in  similar  studies,  we  set  q equal  to  1).  This 
formulation is consistent with an institutional setting where the workers decide real wage 
taking into account the unemployment rate -according to equation (9)- and employers decide 
the amount of labor. 
The activity levels of public and foreign sectors are fixed, while the relative prices and the 
activity levels of the productive sectors are endogenous variables. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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The equilibrium of the economy is given by a price vector for all goods and inputs, a vector 
of activity levels, and a value for public income such that the consumer is maximizing her 
utility, the productive sectors are maximizing its profits (net of taxes), public income equals 
the payments of all economic agents, and supply equals demand in all markets. 
This CGE model follows the basic principles of the walrasian equilibrium -as in Scarf and 
Shoven (1984), Ballard et al. (1985) or Shoven and Whalley (1992)-, enlarged by including 
both public and foreign sectors and explicitly accounting for polluting emissions. 
 
2.2. Databases and calibration 
The main data used in this paper come from the 1990 social accounting matrix for Andalusia 
(SAM  hereafter,  see  Cardenete,  1998).  Emission  data  are  obtained  from  the  1990 
environmental Input-Output tables for Andalusia (TIOMA90), carried out by the regional 
environmental agency
5, which show real observed data on different air pollutants released 
from 74 activity sectors, which were aggregated into 24 to match the SAM structure. There is 
a more recent SAM for Andalusia, specifically, from 1995. Unfortunately, as there are no, 
disaggregate enough, official pollution data by sectors, for any year after 1990, we have 
decided to use the 1990 SAM for the sake of consistency. 
The numerical values for the economic parameters are obtained by the usual procedure of 
calibration  (see,  for  example,  Mansur  and  Whalley,  1984).  Specifically,  the  following 
parameters are calibrated: all the technical coefficients of the production functions, all the tax 
rates  (except  for  the  environmental  tax)  and  the  coefficients  of  the  utility  function.  The 
environmental  coefficients  j  are  obtained  from  equation  (2),  i.e.,  dividing  the  observed 
amount of pollution by the amount of output for every sector. The calibration criterion is that 
of reproducing the 1990 SAM as an initial equilibrium for the economy, which is used as a ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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benchmark for all the simulations. In such an equilibrium, all the prices and the activity levels 
are set equal to one, so that, after the simulation, it is possible to observe directly the change 
rate of relative prices and activity levels. The amount of pollution for sector j is simulated by 
multiplying the output of that sector by the calibrated value of parameter  j. 
The SAM comprises 24 industry sectors, two inputs (labor and capital), a saving/investment 
account, a government  account,  direct taxes (IT and ESS)  and indirect taxes (PT, VAT, 
output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a representative consumer.  
 
3.  SIMULATIONS PERFORMED 
 
In the simulations performed in this paper, we assume that a tax is imposed on the CO2   or 
SO2 emissions. The revenue obtained from such a tax is recycled by reducing PT or IT, so 
that, four different policy combinations are simulated. 
It is well known that Carbon and Sulfur Oxides are among the main polluting substances 
released to the atmosphere. In Andalusia, more than one million tons of SO2 and CO2 are 
released  every  year  (Consejería  de  Medio  Ambiente
6,  2001),  being  industry  and  road 
transport the most polluting sectors. 
We have chosen CO2 because of its well known severe impacts on the ozone layer, global 
warming, and climate change, which have forced some governments to impose taxes on CO2 
emissions  in  order  to  cut  them  down  (Bosquet,  2000).  Given  the  global  effects  of  this 
pollutant, a tax on CO2 emissions is more likely to be set in the national rather than regional 
level, so the results concerning this pollutant can be interpreted as the likely regional effects 
of a hypothetical national tax reform. Regarding SO2, it is one of the main air pollutants in 
Andalusia and its local effects make it a suitable aim for a regional environmental policy. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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Chemical and energy industries are the main responsible for the emissions, accounting for 
about 77 % of the overall SO2 emissions in 1990
7 (Sociedad para el Desarrollo Energético de 
Andalucía, 1994-2000). 
Regarding the taxes to be reduced for recycling revenue, we have selected the payroll tax (PT) 
and income tax (IT). PT is perhaps the one which has been analyzed more deeply in the 
literature (Bosquet, 2000), perhaps partly because of the concern about unemployment in 
Europe  (see,  for  example,  Blanchard  and  Katz,  1997).  The  unemployment  problem  is 
especially  severe  in  Spain  (see,  for  example,  Blanchard  et.al.,  1995)  and  even  more  in 
Andalusia
8. As we have discussed in the introduction, opportunities to get a double dividend 
typically arise when there exist some market failures or some imperfections in the tax system. 
The high unemployment rate in Andalusia can be interpreted as a sign that some market 
and/or fiscal imperfections exist, suggesting that there could be some room to improve the tax 
system and get some efficiency gains. Regarding PT, we should remark that, according to the 
Spanish law, this tax could be modified only by the central Spanish government, and not by a 
regional government. Therefore, as this paper focuses on the economic effects of an ETR in a 
regional economy, the results involving this tax can be interpreted, first, as measuring the 
regional effects of a hypothetic reform performed from the central government or, second, as 
measuring  the  potential  gains  for  the  regional  economy  if  the  local government received 
power to modify this tax in the future.  
As for the IT, we have found very few empirical related references as for this tax, despite the 
recommendations  of  the  European  Commission  (Durán,  2001).  Nevertheless,  this  tax  is 
included in the analysis, first, because of its great relevance in the Spanish Tax System, and 
second, because regional governments have a (limited) ability to manage this tax, so that a 
reform involving IT can be performed more easily in a regional economy than one involving 
PT. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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Combining both pollutants and both taxes, we obtain four possible ETR’s. Among the four, 
the SO2/IT combination is the most plausible from a regional point of view, while the CO2/PT 
combination is the most plausible from a national point of view. The other two intermediate 
cases are also simulated for the sake of completeness. The (regional) economic effects of each 
one  are  simulated,  focusing  specially  on  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  and  Disposable 
Income  (YD)  in  real  terms,  Equivalent  Variation  (EV)  as  a  measure  of  consumer  (non-
environmental) welfare, unemployment and inflation. This information allows us to discuss 
the existence of a (strong or employment) double dividend for the economy under study. 
As noted by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), an environmental tax is likely to introduce 
further economic (non-environmental) distortions. When another distorting tax is reduced as 
compensation, there are two opposite effects, which yield an ambiguous result, depending on 
how distorting the tax to be reduced is. If we reduce a very strongly (slightly) distorting tax, it 
might  provide  a  welfare  improvement  that  could  (could  not)  compensate  the  distortion 
introduced by the environmental tax, in order to give a final positive (negative) impact on 
non-environmental  welfare.  This  reasoning  could  also  work  the  other  way  round:  if  we 
observe that an ETR provides a positive (negative) overall effect on welfare, we can conclude 
that the tax that has been reduced is more (less) distorting than the environmental tax. 
As the magnitude of both types of emissions is very different
9, the value of the tax rates has to 
be set in sensible levels regarding the fiscal pressure they impose on the firms. Instead of 
performing the simulation for a single value of the environmental tax rate (as in other related 
articles), in order to obtain more accurate quantitative information concerning the sensitivity 
of different economic variables, we perform the simulation for a parametric range, with a 
PLQLPXPRI  DQGDPD[LPXPRIHXURVSHUXQLWRISROOXWDQWWRQVIRU622 and thousand 
tons for CO2). These values imply an average tax rate on sales (b, see equation (4) above) that 
roughly ranges from 0,7% to 4% in the SO2 reform and from 0,17% to 1.06% in the CO2 ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
  13 
reform.  In  every  simulation,  once  the  environmental  tax  rate  is  exogenously  fixed,  the 
compensating tax (PT or IT) is decreased with the criterion of keeping real public deficit 






Given the different magnitude of both substances, it is not suitable to perform a precise 
quantitative comparison between the results concerning both pollutants. So, every reform is 
simulated  separately,  quantitative  comparisons  can  be  made  for  reforms  on  the  same 
pollutant,  and  just  some  general  qualitative  comparisons  can  be  made  across  different 
pollutants. 
First, we focus on the reforms involving a tax on CO2 emissions. Table 1 displays the main 
results, including the change rate (%) of emissions, real GDP, real YD, unemployment and 
Consumer Price Index (CPI hereafter) with respect to the benchmark situation, as well as EV 
with respect to the benchmark situation. 
When the CO2 tax is compensated with PT, emissions monotonically decrease with the tax 
rate, as expected. Nominal Output and Income decrease, but as prices also decrease, both 
GDP and YD increase in real terms. Nevertheless, while real GDP monotonically increases 
with the tax rate, YD reaches a maximum (0,03 % increment with respect to the benchmark 
value) when the environmental tax rate equals 1.5 euros per thousand tons, and decreases 
from that point on (although, it keeps above the benchmark level). 
As  a  consequence  of  lower  labor  costs,  unemployment  rate  monotonically  decreases, 
reaching a reduction larger than 3%, so that an employment double dividend arises. Non-ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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environmental welfare, as measured by EV, also increases monotonically for tax rates smaller 
or equal than 2.5, and it reaches a maximum at this point and decreases for larger values. This 
event fulfills the definition of strong double dividend. In fact, this simulation is the only one 
that  shows  a  (limited)  strong  double  dividend  result.  These  results  follow  the  evidence 
obtained by several economists, concerning the  strongly distorting effects of labor taxes, and 
more specifically, the payroll tax in the Spanish Tax System
11. The reduction in this tax 
overpowers the distorting effects of the environmental tax. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
When  the  CO2  tax  is  compensated  by  reducing  Income  Tax,  no  (strong  or  employment) 
double  dividend  follows.  Emissions  reduce,  as  expected,  but  all  economic  variables 
monotonically worsen: real GDP and YD decrease, CPI increases (with an inflation rate up to 
1,5 %), as well as unemployment rate (with an increment up to 4,25%). In this case, we can 
conclude that the distorting effects of the environmental tax (which depress consumption and 
economic activity) overpower the incentive effect from reducing IT.  
By comparing the economic effects of both reforms (figure 1), we can see that the most 
sensitive  variable  is  unemployment,  showing  the  highest  change  rate  in  absolute  value 
(positive in the first reform, and specially negative in the second) among all the variables 
under study. 
Note also that the emission reduction is larger in the IT reform (up to 2%) than in the PT 
reform (hardly 1%). To understand this difference, we can rationalize the final effect of the 
ETR on emissions, as being the result of combining two separate mechanisms that can be 
called scale effect and substitution effect. Regarding the former, given that pollution is a ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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consequence  of  economic  activity,  any policy  that fosters or depresses  economic activity 
tends to increase or decrease polluting emissions as a side effect. On the other hand, the 
environmental tax incentivates the activity of cleaner sectors and disincentivates that of dirtier 
ones, in such a  way that,  apart from changing the scale of the economic activities, their 
composition is altered as well (substitution effect). The latter effect is likely to be always 
negative  (that  is,  to  reduce  emissions),  while  the  sign  of  the  scale  effects  is  ambiguous 
because it depends on the impact on economic activity. In the IT reform, the decrease in the 
activity level induces further emission reductions, so both scale and substitution effects are 
negative, while the PT reform fosters economic activity and causes an indirect increasing 
effect on emissions (positive scale effect) which absorbs part of the (negative) substitution 
effect. 
We can conclude that the IT reform is more successful concerning environmental effects, but 
imposes  higher  economic  costs,  while  the  income  tax  reform  has  slighter  environmental 
effects, but does not appear to have any cost in terms of non-environmental welfare. 
 
  INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
No  strong  double  dividend  arises  when  reducing  PT  compensates  a  SO2  tax,  as  non-
environmental  welfare  (as  measured  by EV) decreases.  In this  case, we get a significant 
relative reduction in emissions (larger than 6% for the largest scope of the reform) and a 
reduction in prices but output and income decrease. As labor costs reduce, an employment 
double dividend is obtained (unemployment rate decreases up to 5%). 
Finally, when a SO2 tax is compensated by reducing IT, we obtain the worst results for all the 
economic  variables.  First,  note  that  non-environmental  welfare  (as  measured  by  EV) ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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monotonically decreases with the tax rate, so that no strong double dividend exists. Regarding 
other economic variables, although nominal GDP and YD increase when the scope of the 
reform is small, this increment is overpowered by a high inflation rate (ranging from 1.2 to 
7.9 %), so that both variables fall in real terms. Income and output fall even in nominal terms 
for  larger  values  of  the  environmental  tax  rate.  Unemployment  rate  also  increases 
monotonically (up to a dramatic 21.24%), so that there is no employment double dividend 
either. On the other hand, this reform achieves the largest emission reduction (reaching 10% 
for a=3), because the scale effect coming from the activity reduction adds to the substitution 
effect. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
When both reforms involving SO2 emissions are compared (see figure 2), it is remarkable the 
bad behavior of unemployment (which appears again as the most sensitive variable) under the 
IT reform, jointly with a significant inflationary effect. Both of these variables improve under 
the PT reform, although in this case there is not a strong double dividend either. In return, as 
previously discussed, IT reform provides the largest reduction in emissions, which becomes 
now one of the most sensitive variables, jointly with unemployment. The important role of 
SO2 emissions  in Andalusia helps  to understand the proportional (environmental) success 
obtained by aiming the tax reform at this pollutant. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
 ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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5.  CONCLUSIONS   
 
In this paper, a CGE model is used to evaluate the environmental and economic effects of an 
ETR in the Andalusian economy, consisting of an environmental tax on CO2 or SO2 emissions 
compensated by reducing either the Income Tax or the payroll tax of employers to Social 
Security. The results suggest the possibility to obtain an employment double dividend when 
any of the environmental taxes are compensated by reducing the payroll tax. In the case of the 
CO2  tax,  it  is  also  possible  to  obtain  a  (limited)  strong  double  dividend  in  the  sense  of 
increasing  non-environmental  welfare  as  well  as  improving  other  economic  variables, 
including inflation, real income and output. 
Some  articles  in  the  literature  find  evidence  supporting  the  employment  double  dividend 
hypothesis when an ETR involving PT is performed (see Rodríguez, 2002; Bosquet, 2000). 
Our results are in the same line and we can also conclude that it is crucial the way to recycle 
the income generated by the environmental tax. When PT is reduced it is possible to obtain an 
employment (or even strong) double dividend, while it is not possible when selecting the IT, 
which is the main direct tax in the Spanish Tax System. From this point of view, our results 
show that PT seems to be a very strongly distorting tax, while IT is not, in comparison with 
the environmental tax. 
Concerning policy recommendations, our results show that an ETR involving a tax on SO2 or 
CO2 emissions and a reduction in the IT is likely to reduce pollution, and SO2 emissions seem 
to be relatively more sensitive to such a reform. Nevertheless, this policy would probably 
generate significant economic costs, including a loss of non-environmental consumer welfare, 
real output and real income. 
On the other hand, an ETR involving a tax on SO2 or CO2 emissions and a reduction in the PT 
is likely to get a more modest pollution cut, but will probably improve employment and, if the ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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CO2 emissions are the target, a limited improvement in non-environmental welfare, economic 
activity (real output) and purchasing power (real income) can be expected. 
Anyway,  when  assessing  the  possibility  to  obtain  a  double  dividend  from  an  ETR,  two 
realistic  general  remarks,  consistent  with  our  results,  should  be  made.  Firstly,  an 
environmental tax is a suitable instrument to  improve environmental performance but, as 
noted  by  Bovenberg  and  de  Mooij  (1994),  these  taxes  are  also  prone  to  cause  further 
economic distortions, so that no economic improvement can be normally expected from an 
environmental tax itself, but any economic benefit obtained from an ETR should rather be 
fully attributed to the reduction in some distorting tax, which could initially be accomplished 
independently of any environmental policy. Secondly, and related to the first observation, the 
classic  economic  statement  “there is no  free  lunch” also applies  in this context (see, for 
example, Fullerton and  Metcalf, 1997). Namely, it is not possible to make a reform that 
provides at the same time very good environmental and economic results. Typically, those 
reforms involving large environmental improvements (first dividend) also imply some non-
negligible economic costs or, in the best of cases (if a very distorting is reduced) some small 
economic benefits, so that the second –strong or employment- dividend is likely to be small or 
even  negative.  On  the  contrary, reforms providing large economic improvements (second 
dividend) will normally cause, as a by-product, rises in pollution which will dwindle the first 
dividend. 
Plausible future research lines include a more accurate analysis of the labor market and a 
study of the dynamic effect of this kind of reform. 
 ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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Total production is given by the Cobb-Douglas technology 








=           (A1) 
where  Qj is total output of sector j, Xdj stands for domestic output of sector j, Xrow j  stands 
for foreign output of sector j, fj is the scale parameter of sector j and  j (1- j) is the elasticity 
of domestic (foreign) output. 
























min Xd       (A2) 
where Xij is the amount of commodity i used to produce commodity j, aij is the technical 
coefficients  measuring  the  minimum  amount  of  commodity  i  required  to  get  a  unit  of 
commodity j, VAj stands for the value added of sector j and vj is the technical coefficient 
measuring the minimum amount of value added required to produce a unit of commodity j. 
Value added in sector j is obtained from labor and capital according to a Cobb-Douglas 
technology: 
j j






          (A3) 
ZKHUH j is the scale parameter of sector j,  j is the elasticity of labor, lj  represents the amount 
of labor employed in sector j and kj represents the amount of capital used in sector j. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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CONSUMERS 
The utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type 
b a












        (A4) 
where CDj stands for consumption of commodity j, SD stands for savings of the consumer 
and  j ,   measure the elasticity of consumption goods and savings. 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Indirect taxes: 
Taxes on output, RP, are calculated as 
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ZKHUH j is the tax rate on the output of sector j and ECj is the Social Security tax rate paid by 
employees of sector j. 
Social Security paid by employers, RLF,  is given by 
j
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where tj is the tax rate on all the transactions made with foreign sector j, arwj represents 
technical coefficients of commodities imported by sector j and rowp is a weighted price index 
of imported good and services. 
Environmental tax revenue, RECO, is given by the following equation: ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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where ecoj  is the environmental tax on sector j. 
The Value Added Tax revenue, RVAT, is given by 
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   (A.9) 
where VATj  is the tax rate ad valorem on (domestic and foreign) commodity j. 
Direct taxes: 
Social Security tax paid by employers, RLC , comes from 
L w WC RLC =           (A.10) 
where WC is Social Security tax rate for employers. 
Income Tax, RI, is computed from 
( ) w L WC TROW TPS   cpi rK wL DT RI - + + + =     (A.11) 
where DT is the income tax rate, TPS stands for transfers from Public Sector to the consumer 
(pensions, allowances, social benefits, unemployment benefits, …) and TROW stands for 
transfers from the rest of the world to the consumer. ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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Table1. ETR with CO2 tax. Results summary. Change rate (%) with respect to benchmark levels. 
Tax rate  Compensated with  Emissions  Real GDP  Real YD  Unemp. rate  EV (*)  CPI 
PT  -0.13  0.03  0.01  -0.39  4275.6 -0.20 
t=0,5 
IT  -0.36  -0.17  -0.17  0.77  -70441.0 0.20 
PT  -0.25  0.05  0.02  -1.16  7603.4 -0.40 
t=1 
IT  -0.71  -0.43  -0.43  1.54  -141208.4 0.50 
PT  -0.37  0.08  0.03  -1.54  10011.1 -0.60 
t=1,5 
IT  -1.06  -0.60  -0.60  1.93  -212297.9 0.70 
PT  -0.49  0.08  0.02  -2.32  11526.8 -0.77 
T=2 
IT  -1.41  -0.86  -0.86  2.70  -283706.0 1.00 
PT  -0.62  0.09  0.01  -2.70  12174.7 -0.95 
T=2,5 
IT  -1.75  -1.03  -1.03  3.47  -355428.9 1.20 
PT  -0.74  0.10  0.01  -3.09  11979.4 -1.13 
T=3 
IT  -2.09  -1.29  -1.29  4.25  -427463.2 1.50 
Source: own elaboration from SAMAND90 and TIOMA90. 
(*): EV in thousand euros.   ETR in a Regional Economy. CGE approach     
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Table 2. ETR with SO2 tax. Results summary. Change rate (%) with respect to benchmark levels. 
Tax rate  Compens.  Emissions  Real GDP  Real YD  Unemp. rate  EV (*)  CPI 
PT  -1.22  -0.25  -0.32  -1.54  -101012.7 -0.5 
t=0.5 
IT  -1.95  -1.16  -1.17  3.47  -378046.8 1.20 
PT  -2.37  -0.59  -0.73  -2.32  -220379.1 -0.90 
t=1 
IT  -3.80  -2.30  -2.34  6.95  -764093.7 2.40 
PT  -3.46  -1.03  -1.25  -3.47  -355697.0 -1.20 
t=1.5 
IT  -5.55  -3.52  -3.60  10.04  -1157776.5 3.70 
PT  -4.50  -1.47  -1.77  -4.25  -505087.6 -1.50 
t=2 
IT  -7.22  -4.81  -4.93  13.90  -1558897.4 5.10 
PT  -5.50  -2.01  -2.39  -5.02  -667069.3 -1.70 
t=2.5 
IT  -8.83  -6.08  -6.23  17.37  -1967394.5 6.50 
PT  -6.46  -2.66  -3.12  -5.41  -840467.9 -1.80 
t=3 
IT  -10.38  -7.32  -7.52  21.24  -2383318.3 7.90 
Source: own elaboration from SAMAND90 and TIOMA90. 
(*): EV in thousand euros. 
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t=0 t=0.5 t=1 t=1.5 t=2 t=2.5 t=3
Emissions PT Emissions IT Real GDP PT Real GDP IT
Unemployment PT Unemployment IT Inflation PT Inflation IT
   
Source: Own Elaboration 
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t=0 t=0.5 t=1 t=1.5 t=2 t=2.5 t=3
Emissions PT Emissions IT Real GDP PT Real GDP IT
Unemployment PT Unemployment IT Inflation PT Inflation IT
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Notes 
                                                 
1 In the appendix the most important equations of the model are specified in detail. For further information about 
the model see Cardenete and Sancho (2003). 
2 The appendix specifies how every direct and indirect tax in the model is computed.  
3 In this model, the government includes local and regional administrations, as well as those activities of the 
central government in the region and any institution that is more than half financed with public funds. 
4 Labandeira et.al. (2003) use a technically different (but conceptually similar) approach, by linking pollution to 
energy  consumption  and  production,  and  modeling  the  energy  use  decision  of the  producers.  With  such  an 
approach,  the  effect  of  the  environmental  tax  happens  through  the  energy  use  decision.  In  this  paper,  the 
environmental tax acts by providing incentives to increase the production of cleaner sectors and reduce that of 
dirtier (energy-intensive) sectors. 
5 Agencia de Medio Ambiente, Junta de Andalucía (1996). 
6 Andalusian Ministry of Environment. 
7  According  to  the  Andalusian  Energy  Program,  Andalusian  industries  are  performing  a  big  effort  to  cut 
emissions down. By the end of the nineties, Andalusian industry had cut its emissions down to the 56% of the 
overall polluting emissions in the region. 
8 In 1993, the unemployment rate was 23.90% in Spain and 34.18% in Andalusia. In 2002, it was 11.36% in 
Spain and 19.65% in Andalusia (data from the Andalusian Statistical Institute- IEA). 
9 In fact, in the TIOMA90, SO2 data are measured in tons, while CO2 data are in thousand tons. 
10 Labandeira and López-Nicolás (2002) criticize the exempt minimum of 1000 tons per year, suggested by 
Durán and Gispert (2001) for being too high, so that, very few firms are subject to the tax. From an empirical 
point of view, a high exempt minimum reduces the effectiveness of the tax, while, from a theoretical point of 
view, it erodes the ability to restore the efficiency that was lost because of the environmental externality. 
11 Sancho (1988), in a national-level study, and Cardenete and Sancho (2002), in a regional-level one, show the 
distorting effects of PT on output prices and sectoral competitiveness. 